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Introduction
Why do some arguments change our moral judgment and others not? What gives 
them the special power to convince us? Are some types of arguments universal? Certain 
studies claim that universal arguments do not exist, and according to them morality is 
relative (Prinz 2007; Sargissian 2014; Quintelier 2013); others suppose morality is 
objective and believe that universal arguments exist (Nichols 2004; Goodwin & Darley 
2012). This study is based on the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt 2012) and aims to 
examine if arguments connected to moral foundations change early adolescents’ moral 
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Abstract: The empirical research reported in this article is based on the Moral Foundations 
Theory proposed by J. Haidt. Objectives. The author examines the impact of moral 
foundations arguments on early adolescents’ moral judgments regarding violating moral 
rules and explores gender-related differences between moral foundations preferences. 
Method. The effect of moral foundations arguments was measured by a newly developed 
meta-ethical position test (MEPT). The MEPT consists of a pretest questionnaire, treatment 
by moral foundations arguments, and a posttest questionnaire. The sample contained 
178 early adolescents from the Czech Republic (84 females and 94 males). The influence 
of the moral foundations arguments was analyzed by comparing the pretest with the 
posttest. Results. 91% of teenagers changed their moral judgment due to confrontations 
with the moral foundations arguments. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test found that the moral 
foundations arguments were significantly relevant, since the P-value was lower than 0.001. 
The Mann-Whitney U test revealed the importance of the gender aspect: P-value care 
equals 0.01 and liberty 0.01. Girls have a preference for care foundation (21% more than 
boys), while boys tended to liberty (27 % more than girls). It seems that moral foundations 
arguments strongly change early adolescents’ moral judgments and can be practically 
applied as a valuable platform for early adolescents’ moral development.
Keywords: Moral Foundations Theory; moral judgment; moral competence; moral 
foundations argument; gender; moral development. 
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decisions. In addition, the second aim is to investigate if gender makes a difference to 
moral foundations preference. Some studies do not reveal any significant differences 
between females and males (Krebs et al. 1994; Jaffee & Hyde 2000), whereas others do 
(Benhabib 1985; Friesdorf 2015). This research uses a meta-ethical position test (MEPT) 
to measure the willingness to violate basic moral rules and the differences between the 
moral foundations preferences of males and females. A deeper understanding of moral 
foundations arguments can help teachers motivate their students and develop their 
morality naturally.
Theoretical Background
The Moral Foundations Theory was developed by the moral psychologist Jonathan 
Haidt and his colleagues, who investigated cultural differences regarding moral judgments 
and consequently found that a few moral values influence people worldwide. In conclusion, 
they suppose these values are innate; they develop gradually as a reaction to the human 
being’s environment and are characterized as instinctive emotional dispositions. These 
fundamental values are labeled as moral foundations and comprise care/harm, liberty/
oppression, fairness/unfairness, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/
disgust. However, moral foundations are, according to Haidt, universal; people just have 
different sensitivities towards them. Liberal-oriented people are more sensitive to care, 
liberty, fairness, and conservatives consider all categories equally (Haidt 2012). The 
preferences of moral foundations were measured by a self-report instrument, namely 
the Moral Foundation Questionnaire (MFQ), which has been examined worldwide. For 
example, a study involving 1,645 participants confirmed the validity of the MFQ in France 
(Métayer & Pahlavan 2014). Likewise, a study conducted in New Zealand also affirmed its 
applicability. This research comprised 3.994 people and focused on the factor structure 
of the MFQ, which used confirmatory factors to perform an independent test of the MFQ 
(Davies, Sibley, & Liu 2014). 
Furthermore, the Moral Foundations Theory has been examined by neuroscience. 
Lewis and his colleagues scanned the brains of 70 young, healthy adults. According to their 
findings, people who have a preference for care and fairness were associated positively 
with the left dorsomedial PFC volume and associated negatively with bilateral precuneus 
volume. People who tended towards authority, loyalty, and purity showed an association 
to the bilateral subcallosal gyrus and the left anterior insula volume (Lewis et al., 2012). 
The influence of moral foundations regarding children and adolescents was indirectly 
investigated by Nucci, Turiel, and Roded, who focused primarily on moral objectivism. 
Their experiment involved 167 children and adolescents between 8-16 (17) years old, 
and showed that participants considered unconflicted situations, i.e., hitting, stealing, and 
not helping, as objectively wrong, whereas conflicted situations were judged differently 
in terms of age. For example, the participants 10-14 (11) years old were more likely than 
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others to follow and agree with the nonprosocial choice, i.e., not helping someone in need 
(Nucci et al. 2017). According to some researchers, understanding care, welfare, and 
fairness develop very early in comparison with the sense of justice. The latter develops 
later and associates with reasoning about mathematical and physical problems (Damon 
1975; Smetana et al. 2014).
The first pioneer who explored the gender aspect in the context of moral orientation 
preference is the well-known British moral psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982). She 
investigated the Kohlberg moral typology and found that women are attached to care; 
men to justice. Studies dealing with gender differences have predominated from that time. 
For example, Jaffee and Hyde (2000) conducted a meta-analysis from over one hundred 
studies; nevertheless, the results revealed only slight differences regarding care and 
justice. Accordingly, the study of Graham et al. (2011), which contained 34,476 adults and 
used MEQ, also found slight differences between the genders. Females scored higher in 
purity, care, and fairness, and males in authority and loyalty. In contrast, Niazi et al. (2020) 
showed there is a significant difference regarding care associated with females. This 
research was focused on a Pakistani sample comprising 300 male and female participants, 
and the MEQ was applied. Similarly, the results of the recent study conducted by Atari et 
al. (2020) involving a large sample of 336,691 adults from 67 countries revealed that 
females scored consistently higher on fairness, purity, and care.
Hypotheses and Methodology
The studies mentioned above confirm that moral foundations influence moral 
judgment. This study presumes that the arguments embedded into the moral foundations 
questionnaire can motivate or even manipulate the decision-making process. 
Hence, the first hypothesis posits that the moral foundations arguments impact the 
willingness to change early adolescents’ moral judgment. 
The second hypothesis deals with gender differences regarding moral foundations 
preferences. The recent studies cited above presented controversial results. Some 
researchers highlight the significance of care regarding females, while others reveal 
different moral foundations preferences. For this purpose, this hypothesis cannot specify 
any moral foundations preference and thus broadly posits that gender influences early 
adolescents’ moral foundations preferences.
The impact of moral foundations arguments and moral foundations preferences 
were measured by a meta-ethical position test. The MEPT is divided into three parts: 
the pretest questionnaire, treatment, and the posttest questionnaire. The pretest 
questionnaire comprises the six different short moral stories dealing with the violation 
of basic moral rules (i.e., John intentionally beats up his classmate). Participants rate the 
extent to which they consider this behavior correct on the Likert scale between 0 – 4 
(0 = strongly disagree and 4 = strongly agree). The second part of the MEPT presents 
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two sections. In the first section, respondents are asked to write motives for violating moral 
rules (i.e., Why might John intentionally beat up his classmate?). The second section presents the 
treatment by the moral foundation arguments aiming to justify violations of the moral rules (i.e., 
John intentionally beat up his classmate because his classmate had been intentionally spitting 
at him all day). 
In the last part of the MEPT, the participants complete the posttest, which is the same 
questionnaire as the pretest. The MEPT is theoretically based on Moral Foundation Theory, and 
the construction of the six moral stories was influenced by the Konstanz Method of Dilemma 
Discussion (KMDD). These stories trigger thinking and emotion, the story’s main protagonist 
usually has a name, and violates some standard moral rules, while the story vividly presents the 
daily life of adolescents (Lind 2019).
Sample and Procedure
Data were collected from six regular schools (in three different parts of the Czech Republic: 
north, south, and central regions) with the principals’ cooperation. The sample comprised 178 
early adolescents, 84 females and 94 males, aged 12 to 13. Pupils took the MEPT during class 
time in 2019, and the procedure took approximately 10 minutes.
Assessment 
The relevance of moral foundations arguments was examined by a statistical comparison 
of pretest and posttest, applying a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which compares two dependent 
samples of ordinal data (i.e., Likert scale). The importance of the gender aspect was investigated 
by a Mann-Whitney U test, which compares two independent samples (i.e., females and males).
Results
1) According to the results, 91% of early adolescents changed their moral judgments due to 
moral foundations arguments. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed statistical differences 





Z-value W-value P-value Result
Betrayal 8.4 1008 <0.00001 Significant impact
Subversion 7.3593 1397 <0.00001 Significant impact
Harm 8.4089 865.5 <0.00001 Significant impact
Unfairness 6.6287 1278 <0.00001 Significant impact
Oppression 7.7361 458.5 <0.00001 Significant impact
Table 1: Results of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test.
1  The participants were also willing to violate moral rules in the pretest under the condition that 
they wrote an argument connected to moral foundations (i.e., John’s case: self-defense, humiliation, 
self-defense, or revenge).
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Figure 1: The impact of moral foundations arguments on moral judgment. 
The Mann-Whitney U test revealed differences between females and males. A 
significant contrast was evident in oppression and harm, whereas others showed slight 
differences (see Table 2 and Figure 2).
Moral foundation Z-score U-value P-value Results
Unfairness 1.71938 3283 0.08544 not significant
Oppression 2.544 3039.5 0.01108 significant
Betrayal 1.45854 3409 0.1443 not significant
Harm 2.51609 3049 0.01174 significant
Subversion 0.79425 3591 0.42952 not significant
Disgust 0.80867 3464.5 0.41794 not significant
Table 2: Results of the Mann-Whitney U Test.




The results reveal the moral foundations arguments strongly influenced the 
willingness to change early adolescents’ moral judgments, P-value < 0,001 and support 
the finding of  Haidt et al. (2012) and other studies (Yalçındağ et al. 2017; Davies, Sibley, & 
Liu 2014; Métayer & Pahlavan 2014; Zhang & Li 2015; Lewis et al. 2012) dealing with the 
universality of moral foundations. On the other hand, the findings of this research do not 
follow the studies reporting that people tend to moral objectivism. For example, Goodwin 
and Darley (2012) found that people consider some moral acts as universal truths. 
Similarly, the research conducted by Nucci et al. (2017) showed that participants across 
ages considered negative unconflicted situations, i.e., hitting, stealing, and not helping, 
objectively wrong. However, moral foundations arguments were regarded universally 
in the sense of motivation (activating the emotions and cognitive processes of moral 
judgments); understanding what is right and wrong was not universal, but rather relative 
to other aspects. 
It appears that early adolescents have in their mind some scenario, some motives, 
some a priori reasons why an agent can act, and possibly this is based on individual 
experiences (i.e., boys found more motives than girls why John could intentionally beat 
up his classmate). These findings differ from Goodwin and Darley (2012) and Nucci et al. 
(2017), probably due to the controversial terminology of moral objectivism and applied 
methodology. In contrast to Goodwin and Darley (2012), this study was not conducted 
with adults. Modern neuroscience emphasizes some brain differences regarding adults’ 
and adolescents’ brains (Blakemore 2013).
The second findings refer to the gender aspect in connection to moral foundations 
preferences. The Mann-Whitney U test found statistical importance related to liberty and 
care. Fifty-four percent of boys, compared to 27% of girls, were convinced that oppressing 
was wrong. Eighty-one percent of girls were convinced that hitting classmates was wrong, 
contrary to 60% of boys. These results follow Carol Gilligan’s theory and similar studies, 
showing that females are more likely to have a preference for care than males (Gilligan 
1983; Friesdorf 2015). Gender differences in the context of moral foundations preferences 
are controversial in the research, and the reason for this should be further investigated 
(Graham et al. 2011; Jaffee & Hyde 2000; Atari et al. 2020; Niazi et al. 2020). This study 
has some limitations (i.e., conducted only in the Czech Republic, using nonparametric 
methods), and for this reason the findings cannot be generalized, and further studies are 
required. 
Subsequent research could be conducted in different countries and religions; 
other studies could employ qualitative methods and apply neuroscience. Some studies 
could focus on practical innovation of moral education and investigate the impact of 
moral foundations arguments on mental perspective experiences. It could lead to the 
idea expressed by Gary Klein (2013). “I think helping people to arrive at insights isn’t a 
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question of pushing the insights on the people or trying to explain it in words, as much as it 
is helping people to gain the experience so they can see the inconsistency for themselves, 
and then all of a sudden the mental model will shift naturally and easily,” Klein (2013, 
214) suggests.
Conclusion
This study dealt with moral foundations arguments and moral judgment regarding 
early adolescents. The findings reveal that the moral foundations arguments powerfully 
influenced the moral decision process and that gender impacted moral foundations 
preferences. Girls were attached significantly to care; boys to liberty. However, the 
moral foundations arguments appear to be universal regarding motivation (activating 
emotional and rational processes of moral judgments), the sense of understanding what 
is right and wrong seems to be relative to many other aspects (i.e., personal experiences). 
Consequently, applying the moral foundations arguments in a class can motivate students 
to see, think, and discuss moral issues more profoundly. Additionally, adolescents can 
learn to be more open and not condemn what they do not truly understand.
References
Atari M., Lai M., & Dehghani M. 2020. “Sex Differences in Moral Judgements Across 67 
Countries,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 287(1937). DOI: 
10.1098/rspb.2020.1201 
Blakemore S. J. 2013. “The Adolescent Brain,” in J. Brockman (Ed.), Thinking: The New 
Science of Decision-making, Problem-solving, and Prediction (pp. 115–131). New 
York: HarperCollins. 
Benhabib S. 1985. “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan 
Controverse and Feminist Theory,” PRAXIS International 5(4):402–424.
Damon W. 1975. “Early Conceptions of Positive Justice as Related to the Development of 
Logical Operations,” Child Development 46(2):301–312. DOI: 10.2307/1128122 
Davies C. L., Sibley C. G., & Liu J. H. 2014. “Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire,” Social Psychology 45(6):431–436. DOI: 
10.1027/1864-9335/a000201. 
Friesdorf R., Conway P., & Gawronski B. 2015. “Gender Differences in Responses to 




Gilligan C. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. 
Cambridge, Mass. – London: Harvard University Press. 
Goodwin G. P. & Darley J. M. 2012. “Why Are Some Moral Beliefs Perceived To Be More 
Objective Than Others?,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48(1):250–256. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.08.006 
Graham J., Haidt J., & Nosek B. A. 2009. “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different 
Sets of Moral Foundations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
96(5):1029–1046. DOI: 10.1037/a0015141
Haidt J. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. 
New York: Pantheon Books.
Jaffee S. & Hyde J. S. 2000. “Gender Differences in Moral Orientation: A Meta-analysis,” 
Psychological Bulletin 126(5):703–726. DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.126.5.703.  
Klein G. 2013. Seeing What Others Don’t. New York: Public Book Affairs. 
Krebs D. L., Vermeulen S. C., Denton K. L., & Carpendale J. I. 1994. „Gender and 
Perspective Differences in Moral Judgement and Moral Orientation,” Journal of 
Moral Education 23(1):17–26. DOI: 10.1080/0305724940230102 
Lewis G. J., Kanai R., Bates T. C., & Rees G. 2012. “Moral Values Are Associated with 
Individual Differences in Regional Brain Volume,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 
24(8):1657–1663. DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_00239 
Lind G. 2019. How To Teach Moral Competence. New: Discussion Theater. Berlin: Logos 
Verlag.
Métayer S. & Pahlavan F. 2014. “Validation de l’adaptation Française du Questionnaire 
des Principes Moraux Fondateurs” [Validation of the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire in French], Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 27(2):79–
107.
Niazi F., Inam A., & Akhtar Z. 2020. „Accuracy of Consensual Stereotypes in Moral 
Foundations: A Gender Analysis,” PLOS ONE 15(3). DOI: 10.1371/journal.
pone.0229926. 
Nichols S. 2004. “After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment,” Philosophical 
Psychology 17(1):3–26. DOI: 10.1080/0951508042000202354.  
Nucci L., Turiel E., & Roded A. D. 2017. “Continuities and Discontinuities in the 
Development of Moral Judgments,” Human Development 60(6):279–341. DOI: 
10.1159/000484067. 
Prinz J. 2007. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quintelier K., Fessler D., Smet D. 2013. “The Moral Universalism-Relativism Debate,” 
Klesis Revue Philosophique 27:211–262.
Sarkissian H., Park J., Tien D., Wright J. C., & Knobe J. 2011. “Folk Moral Relativism,” Mind 
& Language 26(4):482–505. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x.
The Impact of the Moral Foundations Arguments
103
Smetana J. G., Jambon M., & Ball C. 2014. “The Social Domain Approach to Children’s 
Moral and Social Judgments,” in M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of 
Moral Development (pp. 23–45). Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press.
Yalçındağ B., Özkan T., Cesur S., Yilmaz O., Tepe B., Piyale Z. E., et al. 2017. ”An 
Investigation of Moral Foundations Theory in Turkey Using Different Measures,” 
Current Psychology 38(2):440–457. DOI: 10.1007/s12144-017-9618-4.
Zhang Y. & Li S. 2015. ”Two Measures for Cross-Cultural Research on Morality: 
Comparison and Revision,” Psychological Reports 117(1):144–166. DOI: 
10.2466/08.07.pr0.117c15z5. 
